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FUTURE INTERESTS-CoNSTRUCTION-IMPLIED CONDITION OF SURVIVORSHIP-

Decedent's will gave the income from his estate to his widow for life. After
her death the estate was to be held for an additional ten years, during
which time the income was to be equally divided among his named
daughters, Jennie, Bertha, Ida and Martha. At the end of the ten-year
period, the estate was to be divided among the four daughters in equal
shares, with the children of a daughter not surviving the ten-year period
to take her share. Martha died three years after decedent's widow died.
Plaintiff, as administrator of Martha's estate, objected to the payment
by the defendant trustees of the entire income to the surviving daughters,
rather than paying one-quarter to Martha's estate.1 The circuit court
affirmed a probate court order allowing the annual account of the trustees.
On appeal, held, affirmed. Consideration of the entire will leads to the
conclusion that decedent intended that if any daughter died during the
ten-year period, the surviving daughters should take her share of the
income during the remainder of that period. In re Hicks Estate, 345 Mich.
448, 75 N. W. (2d) 819 (1956).
It is axiomatic that in giving effect to a will the court will seek the
testator's intent. Since specific intent is generally obscure, resort to
the process of construction is necessary.2 In support of his contention
that the gift of income to the daughters was to them individually and
not to them as a class, the plaintiff in the principal case advanced four
so-called rules of construction. These are that a gift to individuals is
evidenced by (I) listing the beneficiaries individually by name, (2) the
lack of an express survivorship condition, (3) the express provision that
the income be equally divided, and (4) the fact that distribution of both
the ten-year income and the corpus were to be along the same general
lines of cleavage.a Only the first of these is generally accepted.4 The
court neither affirmed nor denied the validity of the rules contended for.
Rather, it found from a consideration of the will as a whole5 sufficient
indication to persuade it that the decedent's intent was to create a class
gift, with gifts over to the remaining daughters of a deceased daughter's
share.6 The grounds given for this finding were (1) the gift at issue

1

The eventual distribution of the corpus was not at issue.

2 See generally l SIMES AND SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS, 2d ed., 448 (1956); 5
l.AW OF PROPERTY 125 (1952); 3 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT 1189 (1940).
3 See In re Brown's Estate, 324 Mich. 264 at 268, 36 N.W. (2d) 912 (1949);

AMERICAN

Cattell v.
Evans, 301 Mich. 708 at 711, 4 N.W. (2d) 67 (1942), noted in 41 MICH. L. R.Ev. 749 (1943);
In re Coots's Estate, 253 Mich. 208 at 212, 234 N.W. 141 (1931), cert. den. sub nom.
Delbridge v. Oldfield, 284 U.S. 665 (1931), noted in 29 MICH. L. R.Ev. 954 (1931); Wessborg
v. Merrill, 195 Mich. 556 at 569, 162 N.W. 102 (1917). But see In re Ives' Estate, 182 Mich.
699 at 705, 148 N.W. 727 (1914); In re Hunter's Estate, 212 Mich. 380, 180 N.W. 364
(1920). Cf. In re Hurd's Estate, 303 Mich. 504, 6 N.W. (2d) 758 (1942), commented on in
41 MICH. L. R.Ev. 953 (1943).
4 See 3 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT §280 (1940). See generally 105 A.L.R. 1394 (1936).
Cf. 36 A.L.R. (2d) 1117 at 1129 (1954). Compare 3 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT §282 (1940).
5 See In re Brown's Estate, note 3 supra.
6 The possibility that the implied condition of survivorship would result in Martha's
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was of income for a fixed term and not a disposition of corpus, from
which the court implies a purpose to support the daughters during the
ten-year period, rather than a purpose to effect a distribution of his property and (2) in disposing of the corpus after the ten-year period, the
decedent expressly provided for the contingency of a daughter not then
being alive, from which the court concluded that the decedent was not unmindful of the possibility that one of the daughters might not survive the
period and therefore intended separation into shares only in regard to
the final distribution of corpus. While the nature of the construction
process is such that it is always difficult in any given case to conclude flatly
that a court has misconstrued a testator's "intent,"7 it seems clear that
most courts would consider these two factors insufficient8 to warrant the
result reached in the principal case.9
The unfortunate aspect of this decision is that it may be cited to support the broad proposition that there is an implied condition of surviving the time of distrbution in a gift to a class of a remainder interest
·in income. That question was never really at issue in the principal case,
£or the plaintiff apparently conceded. that a condition of survivorship
would exist if the court were to find a class gift.10 While the rule in
Michigan on this point is perhaps obscure,11 the great weight of other
authority holds that such condition is not properly implied merely because a class gift is involved.12 Certain situations might properly call
£or an implication of a survivorship condition,13 but such situations would
be the exception and not the rule. In the usual case, there is no more
share reverting to decedent's estate rather than going over to the other daughters was not
discussed. Cf. In re Coots's Estate, note 3 supra.
7 The principal case does not successfully distinguish Wessborg v. Merrill, note 3
supra, where an opposite result was reached. Indeed, if the words "and their respective
heirs" had had the significance in the Wessborg decision which the court in the principal
case attributes them, then the income in the Wessborg case should have gone directly to
the heirs of plaintiff's wife and not to the wife's estate as was actually decided.
s See 5 AMERICAN I.Aw OF PROPERTY §21.16 (1952).
9 See 5 AMERICAN I.Aw OF PROPERTY §§22.5, 22.8 (1952). See generally 166 A.L.R.
823 (1947). Cf. 6 A.L.R. (2d) 1342 (1949); 140 A.L.R. 841 (1942).
10 In his appellate brief the plaintiff relied on a statement to that effect in I Scorr,
TRUSTS, 1st ed., §143 (1939). The statement does not appear in the second edition of that
work.
11 See Brake, "The 'Vested vs. Contingent' Approach to Future Interests: A Critical
Analysis of the Michigan Cases," 9 UNIV. DETROIT L.J. 61, 121, 179 (1946); 41 MICH. L.
REv. 953 (1943). The rules in other specific states are discussed in Ferrier, "Implied Conditions of survivorship in Gifts of Future Interests in California," 40 CALIF. L. REv. 49
(1952); Schuyler, "Future Interests in Illinois," 50 N.W. UNIV. L. REv. 457 (1955); Long,
"Class Gifts in North Carolina," 22 N.C. L. REv. 297 (1944); 22 TENN. L. REv. 943 (1953);
King, "Future Interests in Colorado," 20 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 227 (1949); 21 ROCKY MT. L.
REv. I, 123 (1948-49).
12 l, 2 SIMES AND SMITH, FUTIJRE INTERESTS, 2d ed., §§146, 578, 653 (1956); 5 AMERICAN
LAW OF PROPERTY §§21.lO, 21.ll (1952). Cf. 3 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT §296 (1940); 2
PowELL, REAL PROPERTY §327 (1950); Bolich, "Some Common Problems Incident To
Drafting Dispositive Provisions of Donative Instruments," 35 N.C. L. REv. 17 (1956).
13 E.g., see 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §2I.17 (1952).
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justification for implying a survivorship condition than there is for implying any other kind of condition.14 This is true whether the gift involved is to individuals or to a class.Hi In view of the plaintiff's failure
to contest an essential issue, the weak grounds which the court gives for
the intent it finds, and the citation of authority clearly not in point,16
this case should be treated as having decided nothing more than that the
specific account before the court be approved and should not be cited to
establish any point of law involved.1 7 The moral of the case is for the draftsman, who has power to minimize resort to the process of construction.is
Herbert A. Bernhard, S.Ed.

14 Cf. Wessborg v. Merrill, note 3 supra, at 569. Automatic implication of conditions
is frowned upon simply because no good reason exists generally for implying conditions
where testator has expressed none. Further, an oft-repeated canon of interpretation is
that the law favors the early indefeasible vesting of interests. See I SIMES AND SMITH,
FUTURE INTERESTS, 2d ed., §165 (1956). One of the Michigan court's previous implications
of a survivorship condition [In re Coots's Estate, note 3 supra] was reversed by the legislature. Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §554.101.
15 See note 12 supra. Compare 2 SIMES AND SMITH, FUTURE INTERES'IS, 2d ed., §613
(1956).
16 E.g., all seven of the non-Michigan cases cited dealt with situations in which the
gift of remainder was postponed until the death of the last survivor of the income beneficiaries. See 140 A.L.R. 841 (1942).
17 This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the opinion incorporates the
plaintiff's incorrect use of the words "tenants in common" as synonymous with the word
"individuals" in discussing the takers of the gift at issue. This confusion has been
embodied in the headnotes of the case report in the regional reporter, from which point
it is likely to spread. Cf. 2 SIMES AND SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS, 2d ed., §617 (1956).
18 Cf. Browder, "Future Interests-Is It Necessary?" 9 OKLA. L. R.Ev. 151 at 159, 161
(1956); Bolich, "Some Common Problems Incident to Drafting Dispositive Provisions of
Donative Instruments," 35 N.C. L. R.Ev. 17 (1956); Brake, "Avoiding Litigations Hazards
Arising From Survivorship Problems in Wills," 17 BROOKLYN L. R.Ev. 1, 171 (1950-51).

